Rehan Dal
RESEARCH ESSAY / 001

Beyond today’s AI.

From answers to evidence.

Two explanations. One hidden rule.
Which test would you try?

01 / A SMALL MYSTERY

The light comes on.
But why?

Suppose I hand you a box with a switch and a light. You flip the switch; the light comes on. You try again. Same thing. It feels obvious that the switch controls the light. But inside the box, something else could be happening—and watching it a hundred more times might never tell you what.

Perhaps the switch powers a heater, and the heat triggers the light. Both stories explain everything you’ve seen. To find out which one fits, you need to make them predict different things.

Keep that box in mind. You’re about to try the test yourself. It’s a small example of the ability I want to investigate in AI: choosing what to do when a good explanation still leaves us guessing.

My interest in model training and efficient systems brought me to this question. How could an AI use a limited amount of time and computation to learn something it can actually check?

02 / TRY TO SOLVE IT

Change one thing.
See what breaks.

Here are the two possible explanations. The arrows show what causes what—not just what happens at the same time.

FIGURE 01 / SAME OBSERVATION, DIFFERENT CAUSES
A / Direct controlSwitchLightB / Through heatSwitchHeatLight
Both explanations predict a light when the switch turns on. Holding the temperature down makes their predictions disagree.

Now imagine you can keep the box cool while the switch stays on. Under explanation A, the light should still work. Under B, it should stay off. Finally, a test that can tell us something new.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIONNOT AN AI MODEL
Switch off
Cool
Light off

Turn on the switch to see the ordinary observation. Then try the intervention.

In this imaginary box, the light stays off when the heat is held down. That separates these two explanations in favour of B. The answer was built into this demonstration; no AI model is running here.

The useful move was choosing an intervention: deliberately changing one condition to see what follows. In a real device, measurements could be noisy and more explanations might fit. We would need further checks before calling the problem solved.

03 / WHAT THIS MEANS FOR AI

I want it to know
what to try next.

A model can list ten reasons a system might fail. That’s useful. The harder job is deciding which observation would rule out nine of them, getting that observation, and changing course when the result is inconvenient.

That is the direction I mean by “beyond today’s AI.” I’m interested in connecting a model’s ability to suggest ideas with a process that can put those ideas under pressure.

FIGURE 02 / THE DISCOVERY LOOP1. Notice2. Explain3. Test4. ReviseEvidence changesthe next step
A proposed workflow. Each test should affect what happens next; a longer explanation alone adds no evidence.

There’s no need to invent a new name for everything that comes next. AI already includes learning, planning, and discovery. AGI usually refers to capability across a wide range of tasks, while autonomy concerns how independently a system acts. Those are different dimensions. Giving software more freedom doesn’t establish that it understands more. [1]

For this project, I’m keeping the target smaller: learn a hidden rule, survive an independent check, then adapt when the setting changes. That would be worth measuring on its own.

04 / WHAT ALREADY WORKS

There are useful
pieces to build on.

This idea didn’t start with me. The research becomes interesting when you look at how different systems connect a suggestion to a check.

CODE THAT CAN BE RUN

AlphaEvolve: let the program face a test.

AlphaEvolve generates and changes code, then uses automated evaluation to guide the search. Its authors report algorithmic and computational improvements. The loop has a useful advantage: a candidate program can be executed and assessed. The difficult part is having an evaluator that captures what you actually care about. [8]

IDEAS THAT CAN BE DEDUCED

AlphaGeometry: pair suggestions with formal rules.

In geometry, a learned model can suggest a construction while a symbolic engine works through deductions. AlphaGeometry shows how that partnership can help in a defined mathematical domain. A proof within a formal system is a different kind of check from a noisy experiment in the world. [9]

EFFORT THAT CAN BE ALLOCATED

More thinking has a cost.

Work on computation used while answering a question finds that effective strategies depend on difficulty. This motivates a practical question: when does another attempt help, and when should the system spend its remaining resources on a test instead? Published reasoning results don’t answer that question for my proposed setup. [6]

My takeaway is to give each part a job it can be judged on. Let a model propose possibilities. Let experiments separate them. Let a checker challenge the final claim.

05 / THE EXPERIMENT I’D BUILD

Give it a budget.
Hide the rules.

I’d start with small simulated worlds, like our box, where a separate program knows the rules. The AI gets observations and a set of permitted actions. It must work out the mechanism without seeing the answer.

Then I’d compare two ways of working. One follows a fixed schedule for proposing explanations and testing them. The other can change its plan as evidence arrives. Both face the same total resource limit.

FIGURE 03 / WHEN TO THINK, WHEN TO TESTFixed schedulePPTTCCAdaptive schedulePTPTCCSame resource limit
P / ProposeT / TestC / Check
Illustrative order only. Blocks are not measured or equal-cost actions; the adaptive sequence can change as evidence arrives.

Suppose the first test already rules out most explanations. Should the system keep generating alternatives, or spend what remains checking the survivor? The adaptive approach gets to make that decision. Whether the decision helps is the experiment.

It could lose. Choosing the next action takes computation too. A simple statistical method might solve these worlds more cheaply, so I’d include that comparison alongside random test selection.

FIGURE 04 / KEEP THE ANSWER OUT OF REACHOne problem. Two roles.AI proposesChecker testsHidden rules stay with the checker
The AI submits an explanation. A separate program checks it against hidden rules and fresh tests. The AI cannot rewrite the score.

Four things I’d measure

  • Did it get the rule right? Use hidden tests, not the quality of its explanation.
  • Does the lesson travel? Change the underlying structure, rather than only renaming the switches.
  • Does it recognise uncertainty? Some permitted tests may never separate the remaining possibilities.
  • What did it cost? Count model work, tool calls, checking, time, and memory—including the effort spent planning.
How I’d keep the comparison fair

First, validate the simulated worlds and scoring with cases whose answers are known. Develop the system on one set of tasks, then freeze the setup before evaluating on an untouched set. Keep ground-truth files, the budget counter, and final scoring outside the AI’s control.

Compare systems on the same tasks, record repeated runs, and report uncertainty around differences. Remove components one at a time—for example, verified memory or adaptive scheduling—to see which part actually contributes.

Publish failures and resource use alongside successes. If there are no verified successes, cost per success is undefined or infinite under a stated convention; it cannot be reported as zero. A small pilot would establish feasibility before fixing the final study size.

Current stage: literature review and experiment design. I haven’t run this study, so there is no performance result or claim of a new architecture here.

06 / HOW IT COULD FOOL US

What if the score
is the wrong target?

Imagine the AI learns the quirks of the checker instead of the rule inside the box. Its score climbs. Its explanation sounds better. We might call that progress—until the box changes and the answer falls apart.

That’s why a separate checker needs fresh tests and its own scrutiny. A test suite can miss a bug. Two models can share an error. An explanation can fit the observations while failing under intervention.

“New” needs checking too. A result new to the model may already be in an old paper. Before calling something a discovery, I’d need to search prior work and say precisely what the contribution is.

The same restraint applies to scale. Learning a rule in a simulator would be a result about that task. It wouldn’t establish general intelligence or the ability to run a real laboratory.

Where memory, new hardware, and consciousness fit

Memory could help if it stores evidence with the conditions under which it was valid. It could also carry an old mistake into a new task. I’d test it as a separate component rather than assume it helps.

Quantum, neuromorphic, and biological computing explore different ways to perform computation. Any advantage needs comparison on a specific workload, including the cost of getting information in and out. None automatically resolves the problem of deciding whether an explanation is true. The source list includes starting points for those directions. [22] [24]

Consciousness concerns subjective experience. Being good at a task or describing an inner life doesn’t settle that question. It is a separate research issue from the discovery experiment proposed here. [26]

07 / WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

Back to the box.

The light coming on looked like the answer. Keeping the box cool revealed how much we still didn’t know.

That is the behaviour I want to investigate: a system that notices when several explanations fit, chooses a test that could separate them, and takes the result seriously.

The next step is to build the environment and establish simple baselines. If adaptive planning helps at a comparable cost, there will be something concrete to explain. If it doesn’t, I want to understand where the extra machinery got in the way.

Either way, the question becomes small enough to work on. That’s a place I’m happy to start.

THE READING BEHIND THIS

Check the sources.

This essay brings together selected research and my proposed experiment. It is a narrative review, not a peer-reviewed paper or a complete survey. AI assisted the synthesis, writing, and site production. Findings from other systems belong to their cited authors.

The 29 annotated references below cover the main argument and wider directions. Access depth varies; some peripheral work was assessed at abstract level. Those limits are recorded in the notes.

Browse the annotated reading list
  1. Morris, M. R., et al. (2023; ICML 2024; later revisions). Levels of AGI for Operationalizing Progress on the Path to AGI.

    Framework/position paper. Useful for separating breadth, performance, and autonomy. It is not an agreed AGI certification.

  2. Chollet, F. (2019). On the Measure of Intelligence.

    Conceptual framework and benchmark proposal. Read for the difference between acquired skill and skill-acquisition efficiency. Do not treat one benchmark as a complete intelligence measure.

  3. LeCun, Y. (2022). A Path Towards Autonomous Machine Intelligence.

    Architectural position paper. Read for predictive world models, abstraction, and planning. It proposes a path rather than demonstrating general autonomous intelligence.

  4. Hafner, D., Pasukonis, J., Ba, J., and Lillicrap, T. (2025; preprint 2023). Mastering diverse control tasks through world models. Nature.

    Empirical control research. Useful for understanding learned latent dynamics and imagined trajectories. Domain results do not establish unrestricted world understanding.

  5. DeepSeek-AI et al. (2025). DeepSeek-R1: Incentivizing Reasoning Capability in LLMs via Reinforcement Learning.

    Technical report; related Nature publication in 2025. Read for training incentives and verifiable reasoning tasks. Results depend on reward and task design.

  6. Snell, C., Lee, J., Xu, K., and Kumar, A. (2024). Scaling LLM Test-Time Compute Optimally can be More Effective than Scaling Model Parameters.

    Empirical study. Central source for adaptive inference; read the limitations on hard problems and difficulty estimation.

  7. Yang, S. (2026). World Models as an Intermediary between Agents and the Real World.

    Position paper/preprint. Connects world models to expensive interaction. Useful agenda, not proof of general superiority.

  8. Novikov, A., et al. (2025). AlphaEvolve: A coding agent for scientific and algorithmic discovery.

    Technical white paper. Central source for code search with automated evaluators. Read its evaluator limitation and self-improvement discussion.

  9. Trinh, T. H., Wu, Y., Le, Q. V., He, H., and Luong, T. (2024). Solving olympiad geometry without human demonstrations. Nature.

    Empirical neuro-symbolic system. Useful model of combining learned suggestions and deduction; scope is constrained geometry.

  10. Gottweis, J., et al. (2026). Accelerating scientific discovery with Co-Scientist. Nature.

    Peer-reviewed system study with selected experimental validations. Central source on scientific hypothesis generation and its limitations. Earlier related preprint: Towards an AI co-scientist (2025), arXiv:2502.18864.

  11. Abramson, J., et al. (2024). Accurate structure prediction of biomolecular interactions with AlphaFold 3. Nature.

    Empirical prediction system. Useful counterexample to equating scientific value with generality.

  12. Lu, C., et al. (2024). The AI Scientist: Towards Fully Automated Open-Ended Scientific Discovery.

    Technical report. Read for automated workflow structure and distinguish simulated review from independent validation.

  13. Schölkopf, B., et al. (2021). Towards Causal Representation Learning. Proceedings of the IEEE.

    Research synthesis and agenda. Read for causal variables and transfer; important assumptions remain.

  14. Lewis, P., et al. (2020). Retrieval-Augmented Generation for Knowledge-Intensive NLP Tasks.

    Empirical retrieval-generation research. Useful basis for external evidence access, not a guarantee of citation correctness.

  15. Kirkpatrick, J., et al. (2017; preprint 2016). Overcoming catastrophic forgetting in neural networks. PNAS.

    Empirical continual-learning method. Read for retention/plasticity trade-offs.

  16. Yao, S., et al. (2022; ICLR 2023). ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Models.

    Empirical agent framework. Read for interactions with tools and environments; distinguish interpretability of traces from faithful access to internal reasoning.

  17. Hu, E. J., et al. (2021; ICLR 2022). LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Models.

    Adaptation method. Relevant to inexpensive task adaptation; distinguish trainable parameter savings from total inference requirements.

  18. Frantar, E., Ashkboos, S., Hoefler, T., and Alistarh, D. (2022; ICLR 2023). GPTQ: Accurate Post-Training Quantization for Generative Pre-trained Transformers.

    Quantization method. Useful for precision/quality trade-offs; verify runtime support and end-to-end benefits.

  19. Rafailov, R., et al. (2023). Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Model.

    Preference-learning method. Read for post-training; preference optimization does not establish factual truth.

  20. Intel (2024). Intel Builds World's Largest Neuromorphic System to Enable More Sustainable AI.

    Official system announcement; manufacturer source, not independent proof of broad advantage. Sandia provides a complementary deployment account.

  21. Solving sparse finite element problems on neuromorphic hardware (2025). Nature Machine Intelligence.

    Empirical application. Useful for a task-specific hardware comparison rather than an overall intelligence claim.

  22. Cerezo, M., et al. (2022). Challenges and opportunities in quantum machine learning. Nature Computational Science.

    Review. Read for prospective advantage and technical barriers. Abstract-level access informed this briefing.

  23. Huang, H.-Y., et al. (2021). Power of data in quantum machine learning. Nature Communications.

    Theoretical/empirical analysis. Useful for understanding classical comparisons and the role of data in advantage claims.

  24. Smirnova, L., et al. (2023). Organoid intelligence (OI): the new frontier in biocomputing and intelligence-in-a-dish. Frontiers in Science.

    Perspective/research agenda. Distinguish a proposed field from demonstrated broad intelligence.

  25. Cai, H., et al. (2023). Brain organoid reservoir computing for artificial intelligence. Nature Electronics.

    Biological computing experiment. Useful example of a substrate demonstration, not evidence of person-like cognition. Abstract-level access informed this briefing.

  26. Butlin, P., et al. (2023). Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness.

    Theory-informed assessment. Useful for carefully distinguishing consciousness from performance; indicators are not a definitive consciousness test.

  27. Kwa, T., et al. (2025). Measuring AI Ability to Complete Long Tasks.

    Empirical evaluation study. Read for task-horizon definitions and external-validity limits. Historical measurements must not be presented as current model capability.

  28. Taylor, M., Chua, J., Betley, J., Treutlein, J., and Evans, O. (2025). School of Reward Hacks: Hacking harmless tasks generalizes to misaligned behavior in LLMs.

    Controlled fine-tuning experiments/preprint. Useful motivation for protected scoring; conclusions are preliminary and setting-dependent.

  29. Templeton, A., et al. (2024). Scaling Monosemanticity: Extracting Interpretable Features from Claude 3 Sonnet.

    Official interpretability research publication. Read for interpretable features and unresolved scaling/interpretation issues.

REHAN DAL

I build AI and trading systems, and explore how to make models useful with fewer resources.

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